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Abstract This paper examines a multi-player and multi-front Colonel Blotto game in which
one player, A, simultaneously competes in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games, against two sep-
arate opponents, 1 and 2. Prior to competing in the games, players 1 and 2 have the opportunity
to form an alliance to share their endowments of a one-dimensional resource (e.g., troops,
military hardware, money). This paper examines “non-cooperative” alliances in which only
individually rational ex ante transfers of the resource are allowed. Once these transfers take
place, each alliance member maximizes his payoff in his respective Colonel Blotto game, given
his resource constraint and player A’s allocation of its endowment across the two games. No
ex post transfers are enforceable. Remarkably, there are several ranges of parameters in which
endogenous unilateral transfers take place within the alliance. That is, one player gives away
resources to his ally, who happily accepts the gift. Unilateral transfers arise because they lead to
a strategic shift in the common opponent’s force allocation away from the set of battleﬁelds of
the playermaking the transfer, towardsthe set of battleﬁelds of the playerreceiving the transfer.
Our result demonstrates that there exist unilateral transfers for which the combination of direct
and strategic effects beneﬁts both allies. This stands in stark contrast to the previous literature
on alliances (see Sandler and Hartley, 2001), which relies on the assumption of pure or impure
public goods.
1 Introduction
This paper examines a multi-player,multi-frontColonel Blotto gamein which one player, A, si-
multaneously competes in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games, against two separate opponents,
1 and 2. Prior to competing in the games, players 1 and 2 have the opportunity to form an
alliance to share their endowments of a one-dimensional resource (e.g., troops, military hard-
ware, money). Our focus is on non-cooperative alliances in which only individually rational ex
ante transfers of the resource are allowed. Once these transfers take place, player A optimally
responds in allocating his resource endowmentacross the two games and then players play their
respective Colonel Blotto games given their resource constraints. No ex post transfers between
the two alliance members are enforceable. We call such an alliance a self–enforcing alliance
without commitment.
The main result of this paper is to show that there is a wide range of parameters in which en-
dogenous unilateral transfers take place within such an alliance. That is, one player gives away
resources to its ally, who happily accepts the gift. Unilateral transfers arise because they lead
to a strategic shift in the common opponent’s force allocation away from the set of battleﬁelds
common to the player making the transfer, towards the set of battleﬁelds common to the player
receiving the transfer. Our result demonstrates that there exist unilateral transfers for which the
combination of the direct and strategic effects beneﬁts both allies.3
Our approach contrasts with the major focus of the literature on the economics of alliances,
dating back to Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), (for a summary, see Sandler
and Hartley, 2001). This literature generally assumes that the resource employed by allies is
a (possibly impure) public good.1 In these models, one player’s resource allocation provides
direct non-rival, non-excludable beneﬁts to an allied player.2 In our model, resource expendi-
ture by an ally is completely rival and excludable. However, through its effects on the strategic
choices of the enemy, strategic externalities may be created. These externalities may sufﬁce to
generate endogenous unilateral transfers in strategic alliances without the a priori assumption
of pure or impure public goods and without commitment.
Our model appears to provide potential insight into the behavior of alliances in historical
military conﬂicts. For instance, it seems capable of explaining the assistance that the United
States provided to the Soviet Union in The Second World War through the Lend-Lease Act of
1941. Estimates of these transfers vary, ranging from $9 billion to $11 billion for the four-year
period after Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Historical accounts of this
program lend some support for the view that this assistance was extended with no expectation
of repayment.3
Despite its signiﬁcant departure from the assumptions of the public goods-based literature
on alliances, our model also obtains results consistent with one prominent conjecture in that
literature, Olson’s (1965) “exploitation hypothesis.” This hypothesis asserts that larger nations
will bear a disproportionately higher share of the common cost of an alliance relative to its
beneﬁts. In ourmodel,aself–enforcing alliancewithoutcommitmentarisesinvolvingunilateral
transfers from player i to player j when player i has a larger resource endowment and the ratio
of player i’s endowment to player j’s endowment is sufﬁciently greater than the ratio of the
total values of the battleﬁelds in the two players’ respective Colonel Blotto games. When such
alliances arise, transfers ﬂow from the player who is resource rich to the player who is resource
1 In Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) alliance expenditure was treated as a
pure public good. Extensions to impure public good expenditure, known as the “joint product
model” originate with Van Ypersele De Strihou (1967). See also Sandler and Cauley (1975),
Sandler (1977), and Murdoch and Sandler (1982, 1984).
2 In the early contributions to this literature it was standard to focus solely on the game be-
tween alliancemembersand taketheenemy’sexpenditureas given.Exceptionstothis approach
include Linster (1993) and Skaperdas (1998), who examine the formation of alliances in con-
tests in which the probability of winning a prize is represented by a contest success function
and the expenditure of each alliance member serves as a (possibly impure) public good in that
it directly increases the expected payoffs of other alliance members for a given enemy expen-
diture.
3 See for instance, Herring (1973, p.38).4
poor. The degree of asymmetry in resource endowments necessary to generate a self–enforcing
alliance without commitment depends not only on the relative aggregate values of the players’
respective battleﬁelds, but also on the absolute magnitudes of the two players’ endowments
relative to that of player A.
Section 2 introduces our three stage game. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium in the ﬁnal
stage of the game, which consists of a multi-player, multi-front Colonel Blotto game in which
one player, A, simultaneously competes in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games, against two sep-
arate opponents, 1 and 2. This section provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium
univariate marginal distributions and payoffs of the component Colonel Blotto games for ar-
bitrary budget constraints and any number of battleﬁelds n ≥ 3. The resource endowments in
this ﬁnal stage are determined by choices made in the ﬁrst two stages. These two stages are
examined in Section 4. In the ﬁrst stage, conditional on their endowments, players 1 and 2 de-
cide on whether to transfer resources, with any positivenet transfer generating a self–enforcing
alliance without commitment. In the second stage, player A decides upon an allocation of its
resources across the two Blotto games, contingent on the choices of players 1 and 2. Section
4 shows that self–enforcing alliances without commitment may indeed occur and characterizes
both the range of parameter values for which they arise and the nature of transfers in such
alliances. Section 5 compares the range of parameters for which positive transfers arise in self–
enforcing alliances without commitment to the range for which positive individually rational
ex ante transfers would arise between players 1 and 2 when complete and binding contingent
commitments may be made as to the ex post division of payoffs. We call alliances in which
such commitments can be made alliances with complete commitment. Section 6 concludes and
outlines extensions.
2 The Coalitional Colonel Blotto Game
Players
There are 3 players, {A,1,2}, and two simultaneous Colonel Blotto games, G1 and G2. Player
A competes in both of the Colonel Blotto games, G1 and G2. Each player i ∈ 1,2 competes in
only one Colonel Blotto game, Gi (see the schematic in Figure 1). The Colonel Blotto game
Gi has ni battleﬁelds, and we will assume that ni ≥ 3, i = 1,2.4 Each battleﬁeld j ∈ {1,...,ni}
in Colonel Blotto game Gi has a payoff of vi > 0. The total value of Colonel Blotto game Gi,
nivi, is denoted by fi ≡nivi. The force allocated to each battleﬁeld in each Colonel Blotto game
must be nonnegativeand each player i∈ A∪{1,2} has a normalized budget of Xi, where player
4 Moving from ni = 2 to ni ≥ 3 greatly enlarges the space of feasible n-variate distribution
functions, and the equilibrium strategies examined in this paper require that ni ≥ 3.5
A’s normalized budget is XA = 1. On each battleﬁeld the player that allocates the higher level
of force wins that battleﬁeld. In the case that the players allocate the same level of force on a
given battleﬁeld, the player that has the higher level of resources in that Colonel Blotto game
wins that battleﬁeld. The speciﬁcation of the tie-breaking rule does not affect the results as
long as no player has less than 2
ni times the forces of their opponent in Colonel Blotto game
Gi, i = 1,2. In the case that this condition does apply this speciﬁcation of the tie-breaking rule
avoids the need to have the stronger player allocate a level of force that is arbitrarily close to,
but above, the weaker player’s maximal allocation of force. A range of tie-breaking rules yield
similar results.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Alliances
In the ﬁrst stage of the game players 1 and 2 choose whether or not to form an alliance. We
focus on the case in which it is not possible for players 1 and 2 to a priori commit to a divi-
sion rule for the alliance’s ex post payoff. In this case each alliance member, conditional on the
resources that are available, maximizes the payoff from their individual Colonel Blotto game.
To emphasize the point that unilateral transfers between allies may take place in the absence
of pure or impure public goods, we assume that neither player’s payoff depends on the even-
tual outcome of his ally’s game. However, prior to the play of their respective games, alliance
members may reallocate resources among themselvessubject to theconstraint that the resulting
allocation of resources is individually rational for each alliance member.
Since there are many game forms that might govern how mutually beneﬁcial transfers might
take place, we instead focus on the following simple question: When does there exist a nonzero
and feasible5 net transfer, t, from player 1 to player 2 (negative t corresponds to a positive net
transfer from 2 to 1) that strictly increases both allies’ payoffs when compared to the case in
which t = 0. In examining this question, we assume that following any choice of t the game
that follows is one in which player A observes the resulting budget constraints, Xt
1 ≡ X1 −t
and Xt
2 ≡ X2+t, takes them as given, and then responds optimally in allocating XA across G1
and G2. We label the resulting allocations of XA across G1 and G2 by XA1 and XA2, respec-
tively. Once the budgets (Xt
1,Xt
2,XA1,XA2) are determined, they become common knowledge
and the corresponding complete information simultaneous move Colonel Blotto games G1 and
G2 are played. If such Pareto improving transfers between players 1 and 2 exist, it is reasonable
to assume that the allies, in this environment of complete information, can implement some
5 Feasibility in this context means that the transfer lies in the interval [−X2,X1].6
such transfer.6 When nonzero transfers between players 1 and 2 exist that are strictly Pareto
improving, we refer to the alliance as a self–enforcing alliance without commitment.
Before examining this game in more detail, it is important to note that one immediate re-
sult of Roberson’s (2006) characterization of equilibrium payoffs in Colonel Blotto games with
asymmetric budgets is that, for a given opposition budget constraint, a player’s payoff is non-
decreasing in his own budget. Hence, if player A’s allocation of his budget over the two games
Gi, i = 1,2, cannot be adjusted in response to transfers, as would be the case if A’s allocation
of XA across the two games preceded or was simultaneous with the transfer between players 1
and 2, neither player could possibly strictly beneﬁt from a transfer of resources to his ally.
In the analysis that follows, let pt
i denote the payoff of the Colonel Blotto game Gi to player
i = 1,2 if a self–enforcing alliance without commitment is formed with net transfer from 1
to 2 equal to t, and p0
i , denote the payoff to player i = 1,2 from acting in isolation, with
no transfer taking place. By deﬁnition, a self–enforcing alliance without commitment forms if
and only if pt
i > p0
i for some t  = 0 for each i = 1,2. Thus, a self–enforcing alliance without
commitment forms if and only if there exists a reallocation of the alliance members’ budgets
such that each player i = 1,2 strictly prefers this to competing with his own endowment, given
the corresponding optimal responses of A in allocating his resources.
Before deﬁning theplayers’ strategies, it is useful to motivatetheleadership role the alliance
takes in determining transfers. As noted above, if player A cannot condition the allocation of
his budget on the available budgets of the alliance members, the private good nature of the
expenditure of players 1 and 2 insures that no transfers take place between the two players.
However, if A has an opportunity to condition his allocation upon the alliance transfers, a pos-
itive transfer from one player to the other may induce a sufﬁcient shift in the optimal budget
allocations of player A away from the transferring player’s Colonel Blotto game to more than
compensate the player for making the positive net transfer. That is, the strategic effect may
more than compensate for the direct effect of the transfer for one player, while the direct effect
more than compensates for the strategic effect for the other.
Whymightit bereasonable to assumethat A can conditionhis allocation across fronts on the
transfers of the allies? One reason is that it seems plausible to believe that transfers between
6 Naturally, there are many game forms that might govern the implementation of transfers of
the one-dimensional resource between the two allies. For instance, in one version of such a
game each ally simultaneously decides upon a nonnegative amount to transfer to its ally. Each
ally then observes these amounts and then the allies simultaneouslydecide whether to accept or
reject the offer of its ally. It is straightforward to show that when nonzero transfers exist which
are Pareto improving, this offer process can implement one such transfer, the transfer in which
the ally making the Pareto improving positive net transfer obtains his most preferred positive
net transfer.7
alliance members are more easily observed than transfers between different Colonel Blotto
games by player A. After all, alliance members are different players and reaching agreements to
transfermaterialbetweenplayersmaytakelongerthansolvinganindividualallocationproblem
and may involve a public announcement. Moreover, as in the case with the Allies ﬁghting Nazi
Germany in The Second World War, it may be the case that the two Colonel Blotto games G1
and G2 represent two distinct geographically separate fronts in a war and country A can transfer
resources between these fronts within the conﬁnes of the geographical area that it controls.
Finally, the notion of the transfer of resources as a commitment seems more reasonable in the
context of a Pareto improving transfer across players than as a shifting of resources controlled
by a single player. Any attempt to undo such a commitment would require the compliance and
coordination of two decision makers, not just the command of one.
Strategies
Let XA1 and XA2 = 1−XA1 be player A’s resources allocated to the Colonel Blotto games G1
and G2, respectively, and Xt
i be player i’s, i = 1,2, level of resources utilized in Gi after a
transfer t is implemented. Each distinct pair of games (G1(Xt
1,XA1),G2(Xt
2,XA2)) represents a
distinct ﬁnal stage subgame of the overall game. In the ﬁnal stage, it is well known that for
a given i ∈ {1,2}, if either 1
niXAi < Xt
i ≤ XAi or 1
niXt
i < XAi ≤ Xt
i there exists no pure strategy
equilibrium in the ﬁnal stage Colonel Blotto game Gi.7
For each player i ∈ 1,2 a mixed strategy in Gi, which we label a distribution of force for
player i, is an ni-variate distribution function Pi : R
ni
+ → [0,1] with support contained in the set





i}, and with a set of uni-




j=1, one univariate marginal distribution function
for each battleﬁeld in player i’s Colonel Blotto game Gi. The ni-tuple of player i’s allocation of
force across their ni battleﬁelds is a random ni-tuple drawn from the ni-variate distribution Pi




j=1. Player A’s mixed strategy,
a distribution of force for player A, is a set compromised of an n1-variate distribution func-
tion PA1 : R
n1
+ → [0,1] and an n2-variate distribution function PA2 : R
n2
+ → [0,1]. Each of the




j=1xj ≤ XAi} and has




j=1, one univariate marginal distribu-
tion function for each battleﬁeld in the Colonel Blotto game Gi. For each Colonel Blotto game
Gi, the ni-tuple of player A’s allocation of force across the ni battleﬁelds is a random ni-tuple




i ≥XAi there, trivially,existsa pure strategy equilibrium
in the game Gi and the player with the higher level of resources in that game wins all of the
battleﬁelds.8






Coalitional Colonel Blotto Games
The Coalitional Colonel Blotto Game, which we label
G {G1,G2,XA,X1,X2},
is the multistage game in which players 1 and 2 ﬁrst implement a feasible net transfer of
resources between themselves, player A then observes this transfer and allocates his budget
XA(= 1) across the two Colonel Blotto games G1 and G2, and then players 1 and 2 individually
compete with player A in their respective Colonel Blotto games by simultaneously announcing
distributions of forces to their respective battleﬁelds, subject to their respective budget con-
straints determined in the previous stages. In the games G1 and G2 each battleﬁeld is won by
the player that provides the higher allocation of force to that battleﬁeld (subject to the tie break-
ing rules discussed above), and each player’s payoff equals the expected value of all battleﬁelds
won.
3 The Final Stage Colonel Blotto Games
We start our analysis with the ﬁnal stage subgames Gi, i= 1,2, and work our way back through
the game tree. Theorem 1 summarizes Roberson’s (2006) characterization of equilibrium in
the Colonel Blotto game. To simplify the exposition we adopt the following notation: let Xi =
max{XAi,Xt
i} and Xi = min{XAi,Xt
i} for i = 1,2.
Theorem 1 (Roberson (2006))
A. SupposeXi and Xi satisfy 2
ni ≤
Xi
Xi ≤1, then theuniqueNash equilibriumunivariatemarginal
distributionfunctionsoftheﬁnalstageColonelBlottogameGi inthegameG {G1,G2,XA,X1,X2}
are as follows:
For the player with Xi forces, denoted as player k,

















Similarly for the player with Xi forces, denoted as player −k,



























ni, then the unique Nash equilibrium univariate
marginal distribution functions of the ﬁnal stage Colonel Blotto game Gi in the game
G {G1,G2,XA,X1,X2} are as follows:
For the player with Xi forces, denoted as player k,










ni x ∈ [0,Xi]
Similarly for player with Xi forces, denoted as player −k,












(Xi)2 x ∈ [0,Xi)
1 x ≥ Xi


























A pair of Nash equilibrium ni-variate distributions of the ﬁnal stage Colonel Blotto game Gi in
the game G {G1,G2,XA,X1,X2} are as follows:
The player with Xi forces, denoted player k, randomly allocates 0 forces to ni−2 battleﬁelds.
On the remaining 2 battleﬁelds player k utilizes a bivariate distribution that has m mass points
and each mass point receives the same weight, 1
m. Player k’s mass points on the 2 remaining









, j = 0,...,m−1.
Player −k, randomly allocates Xi forces to n−2 battleﬁelds. On the remaining 2 battleﬁelds
player −k utilizes a bivariate distribution that has m mass points and each mass point receives
the same weight, 1









, j = 0,...,m−1.






, and the expected







8 The ﬁnal stage games G1 and G2 are constant-sum games. Consequently, any Nash equilib-
rium strategies derived are also optimal strategies and the corresponding payoffs are security
level payoffs.10
For a proof of Theorem 1 see Roberson (2006). A majorpart of this proofis establishingthe ex-
istence of ni-variate distributions with the given univariate marginal distribution functions and








j=1xj = Xi} respectively.
Note that uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs follows immediately from the fact that the ﬁ-
nal stage Colonel Blotto games are constant–sum. These payoffs are illustrated in Figure 2 as a
function of
Xi
Xi. A salient feature of this characterization is that as the number of battleﬁelds, ni,
becomes large, the ranges of
Xi
Xi covered by (B) and (C) of Theorem 1 collapse to zero, and the
weaker player’s payoff (in these ranges) goes to zero as well. We use these facts in the analysis
of the second stage game that follows.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
4 Stages One and Two: Alliances and Resource Allocations
We begin in stage two with player A’s optimal allocation of resources between the two Colonel
Blotto games. The primitives in this section are the payoffs derived in the previous section.
Given the above characterization, it follows that the form of player A’s payoff function de-
pends critically on the transfer of resources between players 1 and 2 in the ﬁrst period. In fact
for player A there are 64 different regions each with a distinct form for the payoff function.







, i = 1,2, satisfy one of the three
conditions of Theorem 1, or one player has more than ni times the budget of the other in Gi.
For example, assume that XA = 1 > Xt
1+Xt
2. If player A divides his resources between the
































The payoff functions for the remaining regions are similarly constructed.
To simplify the analysis the number of battleﬁelds ni is assumed to be arbitrarily large.
(However, the total value of each Colonel Blotto game fi = nivi is held constant.) Thus, the









≤ 1 for each Colonel Blotto game Gi, i = 1,2. For given post-transfer levels of resources
of players 1 and 2, Xt
1 and Xt
2 respectively, player A’s payoffs in each Colonel Blotto game are
shown in Figure 3 below.
[Insert Figure 3 here]11
Player A’s optimal second stage allocation of resources between the two Colonel Blotto
games is determined by the marginal payoffs in each Colonel Blotto game. In particular, there
are four qualitatively distinct cases of optimal resource allocations for player A. These corre-
spond to the four distinct regions of (Xt
i,Xt





















. Then player A allocates all of
his resources to Colonel Blotto game Gi.
In Case 1, each unit of resource that player A allocates to the Colonel Blotto game Gi has a
marginal payoff that is higher than the ﬁrst unit allocated to G−i. If the initial endowments X0
1,
X0
2 are such that this case holds, it is clear that there can be no nonzero net transfer that strictly




































In Case 2, A’s budget is sufﬁcientlylarge that it is optimalto allocate alevel ofresources greater
than Xt
i to the Blotto game Gi, XAi > Xt
i, thereby hitting the range of diminishing returns (see
Figure 3). At themargin A equates thereturn to an extraunit ofresource allocated to gameGi to





































































In Case 3 player A has a sufﬁcient level of resources to be able to set the marginal payoffs from
the two Colonel Blotto games equal at levels greater than the corresponding resource levels of
















and 1 ≤ X0
1 +X0
2. Then any pair (XA1,XA2) such that XA1+XA2 = 1
and XAi ≤ Xt
i, i = 1,2 is an optimal response of player A.
In Case 4 any allocation by player A in which XAi ≤ Xt
i, i = 1,2 sets the marginal payoffs from
the two Colonel Blotto Games equal. As is shown in Section 5, if players 1 and 2 had the ability12
to commit to binding agreements and 1 ≤ X0
1 +X0







maximizes the sum of the two players’ payoffs. Thus, it is clear that in Case 4 there can be no
nonzero net transfer that strictly improves upon the allocation for both players.






pairs corresponding to the cases described above
for values of fi and f−i such that
fi
f−i ≥ 1. The analysis is analogous when
fi
f−i < 1.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
We now determine when there exists a nonzero transfer t from player 1 to player 2 that







-contingent subgame payoffs arising when player A optimally responds as
detailed in Cases 1 through 4 above, and the resulting Colonel Blotto game payoffs are given
as in Theorem 1, part (A).
By deﬁnition a self–enforcing alliance without commitment exists if and only if there exists





















in each of the respective games Gi, i = 1,2.






satisfy the conditions of Case 1, then
there is no incentive for a non-zero transfer to take place (player −i is already receiving his
highest feasible payoff).9 The following two propositions examine alliance formation when the







satisﬁes the conditions of Case 2. Then a self–enforcing al-
liance without commitment exists in which player −i transfers a net positive level of resources












No self–enforcing alliance exists in which player i transfers a positive net level of resources.
Proof With the initial endowments satisfying the conditions of Case 2, player A’s optimal al-








9 While our focus is on alliance transfers that strictly beneﬁt both alliance members, it is
instructive to note that in the portion of the Case 1 region in which 1 ≤ X0
i or 1 > X0
i and
fi




, player −i is indifferent between keeping his endowment and making a transfer to


















. Given player A’s optimal stage 2 allocation of






















































the conditions of Case 2 (
fi
2X0
i −2t increases while
f−i
2X0
−i+2t decreases), and that in this case player

































It follows immediately that since
¶pt
i
¶t < 0 for all feasible positive net transfers t, it is clear that
any nonzero strictly Pareto improving transfer must be from player −i to player i. Furthermore,











i +t (i.e. theroles reversed)
since in both cases player −i would be worse off. Thus we can restrict our attention to alliance
transfers from player −i to player i in which the resulting levels of resources remain in the
current Case 2.
If a positive net transfer, t, of resources from player −i to player i takes place, resulting in
an allocation that remains in Case 2, player A’s optimal allocation of forces between the two





































































1/2, which is positive for all t. Thus player i is always willing




























¶t |t=0 > 0, a sufﬁciently small positive transfer would beneﬁt −i as well. More-
over, it is straightforward to show that if
¶pt
−i
¶t |t=0 ≤ 0 then
¶pt
−i
¶t will remain nonpositive for all
t > 0 such that t < X0
−i. Hence player −i will strictly beneﬁt from a positive transfer to player
i if and only if
¶pt
−i

















satisﬁes the conditions of Case 3. Then a self–enforcing al-
liance without commitment exists in which player −i transfers a net positive level of resources














No self–enforcing alliance exists in which player i transfers a positive net level of resources.
Proof With the initial endowments satisfying the conditions of Case 3, player A’s optimal al-






























. Given player A’s optimal stage 2 allocation



























If a positive net transfer, t > 0, of resources from player −i to player i takes place, it is
feasible that the resulting allocation may remain in Case 3 or may switch to Case 2. First
looking at transfers within Case 3, player A’s optimal allocation of resources between the two







2 . Hence, player

























and player i’s payoff follows directly. Clearly if
¶pt
−i
¶t |t=0 >0 a sufﬁciently small positivetrans-
fer would beneﬁt −i, and if
¶pt
i
¶t |t=0 >0 a sufﬁciently small transfer would beneﬁt i. Moreover,
it is straightforward to show that if
¶pt
−i
¶t |t=0 ≤ 0 then
¶pt
−i
¶t will remain nonpositive for all t > 0
such that t < X0






¶t . Hence within the range of transfers that
remain in Case 3, both players 1 and 2 will strictly beneﬁt from a net positive transfer from
player −i to player i if and only if
¶pt
−i
¶t |t=0 > 0.




























Thus, there exists a strictly Pareto improving transfer t > 0, from −i to i, that remains in the














2. We claim that this
is also a necessary condition for the existence of a strictly Pareto improving transfer from −i to
i that switches to Case 2. This results from the fact that the subset of Case 2 allocations where
¶pt
−i
¶t |t=0 > 0 (delineated in Proposition 1) may be reached through a transfer from −i to i only
if the initial Case 3 allocation satisﬁes the condition of Proposition 2.


























satisﬁes this constraint. Thus, player i never offers a positive net transfer to player −i that
results in an allocation in Case 3. As shown in Proposition 1, once in Case 2 player i also never
offers a positive net transfer to player −i. It follows directly that given an initial endowment
in Case 3 there exists no strictly Pareto improving positive net transfer from player i to player
−i that crosses over into Case 2. Thus, player i never offers a positive net transfer to player −i.
Q.E.D.
Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that there are several ranges of parameters in which en-
dogenous unilateral transfers take place. That is, a self–enforcing alliance without commitment
forms. The set of (X0
i ,X0
−i) pairs for which such an alliance forms is illustrated in Figure 5 for
the case in which XA =1. The (X0
i ,X0
−i) pairs satisfying the conditionsof Cases 2 or 3 and lying
in the region above and to the left of the bold lines are the initial endowments for which these
alliances arise.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
As is evident from Figure 5 and the inequalities that determine this region in the statements
of the two propositions, self–enforcing alliances without commitment form only when players16
1 and 2 have sufﬁciently asymmetric endowments both in absolute terms and relative to the
corresponding values of their Blotto games. In particular, in the region of endowments corre-
sponding to Case 3, the boundary delineating the set of endowments for which these alliances
form is linear (see Figure 5). Throughout this region, self–enforcing alliances without commit-





exceeds a constant threshold,
which is greater than max{1,
f−i
fi }. This insures that alliance transfers only ﬂow from player −i,
the player with the higher endowment, to player i, the player with the lower endowment and





exceeds the ratio of Blotto game values
f−i
fi .
In the region of endowments corresponding to Case 2, the boundary of the set of endow-
ments for which these alliances form is concave in X0
i . Within this region, as the sum of the
endowments, X0
i +X0





above which alliances form de-
creases. When
f−i
fi < 1, as in panel (a) of Figure 5, the boundary of the set of endowments for
which these alliances form intersects the boundary of the region corresponding to Case 1 along
the 45◦ line. One consequence (as is illustrated in Figure 5, panel (a)) is that there exist param-
eter conﬁgurations for which self–enforcing alliances without commitment arise even though
the initial endowments are arbitrarily close to equality. When
f−i
fi > 1, as in panel (b) of Figure




i before it reaches the boundary of
the Case 1 region. Indeed, from the condition provided in Proposition 2, this happens precisely
when X0
i +X0
−i = 2. One consequence, (as is illustrated in Figure 5, panel (b)) is that there ex-
ist parameter conﬁgurations for which self–enforcing alliances without commitment arise even





is arbitrarily close to the ratio of Blotto game
values
f−i
fi .10 Finally, as in the region of endowments corresponding to Case 3, for Case 2 en-
dowmentsalliancetransfers always ﬂow from player −i, the playerwith thehigherendowment,





exceeds the ratio of Blotto game values
f−i
fi .
In this sense, the nature of transfers in our model conform to a version of the “exploitation
hypothesis”. When self–enforcing alliances without commitment form, transfers ﬂow from the
player who is resource rich to the player who is resource poor, both in absolute terms and
relative to the total value at stake in their respective Colonel Blotto games with player A.
Moreover, when self–enforcing alliances without commitment form, it must be the case that
the combination of direct and strategic effects of the unilateral transfer beneﬁts both allies.
Clearly, since the direct effect harms the player making the transfer and beneﬁts the player re-
ceiving the transfer, it must be the case that the strategic effect beneﬁts the transferring player










and harms the receiving player (if player A moves resources away from the game of the trans-
ferring player, these resources ﬂow to the game with the receiving player). In this context, it is
interesting to identify the source of a breakdown of the existence of self–enforcing alliances
without commitment, that is, whether it is the relatively resource poor ally who declines to re-
ceive a transfer or the relatively rich ally who declines to initiate the transfer. The details of
the proofs of these two Propositions indicate that it is always the resource rich ally whose in-
centive constraint binds ﬁrst. That is, the region where such alliances form is bounded by the
willingness of the player making the transfer.
5 Alliances with Complete Commitment
As a benchmark for the analysis of self–enforcing alliances without commitment, it is useful
to examine the nature of ex ante transfers that would arise between players 1 and 2 if complete
and binding commitments could be made concerning the ex post division of payoffs. We call
alliances in which such commitment can be made alliances with complete commitment.
































i nonzero transfers of resource endow-
ments will always take place.11
Proposition 3 Let ˆ X = X0
1 +X0
2. In any alliance with complete commitment, the allocation of


















i , then no transfers take place.
Proof We begin with the case that ˆ X ≥ 1. Thus, in the alliance with complete commitment, the
allocation of the alliance budget to the two Colonel Blotto games may satisfy the conditions for
Case 1, Case 2, or Case 4 (see Figure 4). Clearly, any allocation by the alliance that satisﬁes
the conditions for Case 1 is not an equilibrium strategy. In Case 1 the alliance wins all of the
battleﬁelds in Blotto game −i and player A allocates zero resources to Blotto game −i. Thus,
the alliance can strictly increase its payoff by diverting resources from the Blotto game −i to















11 We abstract away from issues concerning the precise ex post division of the alliance’s joint
payoff. For cooperative game theoretic approaches to the theory of alliance costs and beneﬁts
see Sandler (1999) and Arce M. and Sandler (2001).18
Similarly, any allocation by the alliance that satisﬁes the conditions for Case 2 is not an




2 , given any allocation, (X0
i ,X0
















































. It follows directly that
¶pt
12
¶t > 0 for all






f−i . Thus, the alliance can strictly increase its payoff by diverting














. Given the arguments given above
concerning Cases 1 and 2, it is clear that their are no proﬁtable deviations for the alliance.
Lastly, in the case of an alliance with complete commitment and ˆ X < 1, the allocation of
the alliance budget to the two Colonel Blotto games may satisfy the conditions for Case 2 or
Case 3 (see Figure 4). Given the above arguments, any allocation by the alliance that satisﬁes
the conditions for Case 2 is not an equilibrium strategy. In Case 3 the payoff of the alliance














































































In contrast to the restricted range of initial endowments for which transfers take place in
self–enforcing alliances without commitment, such transfers take place almost everywhere un-




i does no transfer take place.
However, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 5, there exist initial endowments for which a self–





i. This arises for a subset of the range of endowments in which the alliance
member (−i in the ﬁgure), with the higher Colonel Blotto game value (f−i) has an endowment,
X0
−i, both larger than that of player A and larger than the product of the ratio of game values




Of course these two types of alliances form the two endpoints of the entire spectrum of pos-
sible levels of commitment. However, one might conjecture that intermediate levels of commit-
ment generate regions of initial endowments where nonzero transfers take place that are nested
between the regions corresponding to these two extremes.
6 Conclusion
The literature on the economics of alliances, originating with Olson (1965) and Olson and
Zeckhauser (1966) focuses on the case where defense expenditures are a (possibly impure)
public good and the threat of attack is exogenous. This paper extends this literature by examin-
ing the formation of self–enforcing alliances withoutcommitmentin a multi-player,multi-front
Colonel Blotto game. In this case, the payoff to each alliance member is completely exclud-
able and rival. Moreover, the common opponent is able to observe and react to the formation
of the alliance and the resulting transfer of resources. Remarkably, we ﬁnd that self–enforcing
alliances without commitment form for a wide range of parameters. With ex ante asymmetry
of resources — both in absolute terms and relative to the respective values at stake in the al-
lies’ Colonel Blotto games — unilateral transfers from the relatively resource-rich ally to the
relatively resource-poor ally cause a reallocation of the common opponent’sresources that ben-
eﬁts both allies. For the ally making the transfer, the positive strategic effect of the opponent’s
reallocation of resources away from their Blotto game makes up for the negative direct effect
of the reduction in own resources. For the ally receiving the transfer, the positive direct effect
of greater resource availability dominates the negative strategic effect of a higher opponent
resource level.
Potential extensions of the model include the analysis of a more general network structure
of battleﬁeld alignment in which players may be engaged in several conﬂicts with different
sets of adversaries, who may themselves be engaged in other conﬂicts. In this context, it is
possible to carry out a nontrivial examination of the nature of the alliances that form and the
composition of their membership. Our model also provides a useful tool for examining the
strategic effects of precommitment to budgetary transparency. Since the payoffs and strategies
in any Blotto gameare parameterized by theplayers’ budgets, ourmodel is a natural framework
for examining the costs and beneﬁts of ﬁner or coarser budgetary information and the effects
of budgetary aggregation and disaggregation in entities engaged in conﬂict. It may also serve
as a useful framework for the study of espionage.
Finally, although the analysis in this paper is framed in the context of military alliances, it is
readily adapted to other contexts. For instance, in the context of multiple-product R&D races
or patent races, it can be applied to explain research joint ventures and silent cross-industry20
partnerships (“cash infusions”) between ﬁrms that do not compete in the same market, but face
a common conglomerate competitor.
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Fig. 5 Ranges of Alliance Formation